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QUESTION PRESENTED 
1. When evaluating whether a law enforcement 
officer is entitled to qualified immunity in a case 
involving a falsehood or material omission in a 
warrant affidavit, whether the nature of the corrected 
affidavit and its effect on probable cause are questions 
of fact or law? 
2. Whether qualified immunity is available to law 
enforcement officers who intentionally include a 
falsehood or material omission in a warrant affidavit? 
ii 
 
   
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS 
The Petitioner in this case is Thomas A Bowden, 
an individual.  Petitioner was the plaintiff and 
appellee below.   
The Respondents are: 
Steve Meinberg, an officer with the Jefferson 
County, Missouri Sherriff’s office; 
Patrick Hawkins, an officer with the Jefferson 
County, Missouri Sherriff’s office; 
Chris Hoffman, an officer with the Jefferson 
County, Missouri Sherriff’s office; 
Benjamin Simmons, an individual; 
Aaron Gyurica, an individual; and  
Wes Wagner, the Jefferson County, Missouri 
circuit clerk. 
The Respondents were defendants and appellants 
below.  
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PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
Petitioner Thomas A. Bowden respectfully 
petitions this Court for a writ of certiorari to review 
judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Eighth Circuit in this case.  
OPINIONS BELOW 
The opinion of the Eighth Circuit is reported at 
807 F.3d 877, and is reproduced at page 1a of the 
appendix to this petition (“App.”).  The unpublished 
opinion of the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Missouri is reproduced at page 11a 
of the appendix. 
JURISDICTION 
The Eighth Circuit rendered its decision on 
August 25, 2015.  Bowden filed a timely petition for 
rehearing en banc on September 22, 2015 after 
receiving an extension of time to file the petition, and 
the court denied the petition on October 22, 2015.  On 
December 16, 2015, Justice Alito granted an 
application to extend the time in which to file this 
petition until February 19, 2015.  This Court has 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1). 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED 
The text of the relevant statutes is set forth in the 
appendix to this petition. 
INTRODUCTION 
The Eighth Circuit granted qualified immunity to 
a sheriff’s deputy who filled out a probable cause 
report relying exclusively on a witness statement he 
later admitted he believed to be false.  The deputy did 
not inform the prosecutor or magistrate of his belief, 
and Thomas Bowden was arrested as a result.  Yet the 
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Eighth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of 
qualified immunity, concluding that a corrected 
affidavit still “could lead a man of reasonable caution 
to infer” that a crime had occurred.  App. 8a (emphasis 
added).  In the Second and Third Circuits, an officer 
in similar circumstances is entitled to qualified 
immunity only if “a magistrate would have issued the 
warrant on the basis of the corrected affidavits.”  
Southerland v. City of N.Y., 680 F.3d 127, 144 (2d Cir. 
2011) (emphasis added) (quoting Walczyk v. Rio, 496 
F.3d 139, 158 (2d Cir. 2007)); see also Sherwood v. 
Mulvihill, 113 F.3d 396, 401 (3d Cir. 1997) (noting 
that qualified is available only if a magistrate could 
not conclude that a corrected affidavit was 
insufficient).  Other circuits have developed still more 
standards.  The Ninth Circuit joins the Eighth in 
rendering corrected affidavits issues of law, and the 
Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits treat the questions 
as mixed questions of fact and law, whereby a jury 
must resolve disputed underlying facts, but the court 
determines whether probable cause existed in light of 
the corrected affidavit. 
The circuits’ disagreement reflects a broader 
division among the circuits about the role of a jury in 
determining the nature and effect of a corrected 
affidavit in the qualified immunity context.  While 
each of the circuits borrows its rule of decision in these 
cases from this Court’s test in Franks v. Delaware, 
they do so without any guidance on how that criminal 
case’s test should interact with the standards of 
summary judgment and qualified immunity in a civil 
action.  Consequently, the circuit courts’ various 
approaches to these claims diverge significantly.   
As a result, falsehoods and material omissions in 
warrant affidavits are far less likely to be 
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compensable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the Eighth and 
Ninth Circuits than they are in other circuits have 
decided the issue.  And unfortunately, falsehoods and 
material omissions in warrant affidavits are an all-
too-common occurrence.  Resolving these issues would 
create uniformity in the many cases requiring a 
corrected affidavit, and it would provide needed 
guidance to the lower courts. 
This Court should grant certiorari and resolve 
this conflict among the circuits.  By failing to draw all 
reasonable inferences in the petitioner’s favor while 
reconstructing and interpreting the warrant affidavit, 
the Eighth Circuit improperly took his case out of a 
jury’s hands. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Factual Background: In 2009, Petitioner Thomas 
Bowden lived with his wife in a “very rural” part of 
Jefferson County, Missouri. (JA 171). The subdivision 
where their home was located was accessible only by 
one private gravel road, which crosses a creek via a 
low water bridge near the Bowdens’ property. (JA 
171). Prior to the events giving rise to this case, illegal 
activity, including trespassing and manufacture of 
methamphetamine, was common in the area around 
the Bowdens’ home. (JA 118-120, 181).  
One morning in July, Bowden and his wife saw a 
pickup truck and two men they did not recognize on 
the low water bridge at the edge of the Bowdens’ yard. 
(JA 181, 118). Bowden called out loudly three times 
for the men to identify themselves, but they did not 
respond. (JA 118, 122, 181). Bowden went inside and 
got a single-shot 20-gauge shotgun, loaded with a 
single shell. (JA 122, 181). He went back outside and 
called to the two men once or twice more, but they did 
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not answer. (JA 122). Bowden saw one of the men 
make a “really quick movement like he was reaching 
into the truck to get something,” and was afraid that 
the man was reaching for a gun, so Bowden fired his 
shotgun in the air. (JA 118, 122). Bowden was 
confident that the shotgun shell couldn’t have hurt 
anyone at that distance; he simply wanted to get the 
man’s attention and make him stop, which he did. (JA 
118). Looking at the men, Bowden was facing west; he 
pointed the shotgun south over his shed, about a 110 
degree angle from the men, when he fired. (JA 122-23, 
181).  
The two men on the bridge were Respondent 
Benjamin Simmons and Respondent Aaron Gyurica. 
Simmons admits that when he heard the shotgun 
blast, he was more curious than frightened, and 
thought Bowden was shooting at a squirrel or 
something similar. (JA 469). Simmons walked up the 
road toward Bowden’s home and asked Bowden “Did 
you get him?” which Bowden took to mean that 
Simmons thought he had shot at an animal. (JA 123-
24). Bowden asked Simmons his name and what 
Simmons was doing there. (JA 124). Simmons 
explained that his step-grandmother and 
grandmother lived up the road, and he had been 
coming to the area to fish since the early 1980s. (JA 
123-24, 488). During this conversation Bowden held 
the shotgun in his hands, pointed away from 
Simmons. (JA 125, 498). When he learned that 
Bowden had fired the shot to get his attention, 
Simmons “went ballistic” and started “cussing and 
carrying on.” (JA 124-25). Simmons threatened 
Bowden and said “we will see what will get done about 
this.” (JA 125).  
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Simmons and Gyurica drove up the road to the 
home of Barbara Voyles, Simmons’ step-grandmother, 
where Simmons called 911 and reported that Bowden 
had shot at him. (JA 125). Bowden called 911 as well. 
(JA 126). Respondent Vernon Martin, a deputy county 
sheriff, arrived to investigate, and spoke to Bowden, 
Simmons, and Gyurica. (JA 236-252). Deputy Martin 
recalls that Simmons, insisting that Martin arrest 
Bowden, was aggressive and agitated, “almost to the 
point where he wanted to tell me how to do my job.” 
(JA 175). Both Simmons and Gyurica admitted to 
Deputy Martin that they did not see Bowden shoot the 
gun at them; their only evidence that Bowden had 
fired the shotgun at them was the fact that they heard 
a gunshot and then saw leaves falling near them. (JA 
176-77, 499-502). Deputy Martin noted that their 
descriptions of the incident were “very vague.” (JA 
188). Additionally, they gave Deputy Martin an 
incorrect description of Bowden’s shotgun. Simmons 
said Bowden had a 12-gauge pump-action shotgun; 
Bowden’s shotgun was a single-barrel 20-gauge 
loaded with fieldshot for hunting small game. (JA 176-
77).  Deputy Martin did not find Simmons credible. 
(JA 178-79). However, Deputy Martin did find 
Bowden credible. (JA 183). After fully investigating 
and consulting the Missouri statutes, Deputy Martin 
told all the parties that he did not believe that Bowden 
had committed any crime, and did not intend to write 
a report or bring any charges. (JA 180, 185, 191, 219-
20, 275, 457).  
Unfortunately for Bowden, the Simmons family 
had powerful friends. The Simmons family knew 
Howard Wagner, the elected Circuit Clerk of Jefferson 
County, and his family. (JA 271-72, 451-42). Simmons’ 
step-grandmother, Barbara Voyles, worked with 
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Howard’s father, and is a long-time family friend of 
the Wagners. Benjamin Simmons’ mother, Norma 
Elaine Simmons, worked for the Jefferson County 
Recorder of Deeds, in the same building as Wagner. 
(JA 451-52). When Deputy Martin told Norma 
Simmons and Barbara Voyles that he did not intend 
to charge Bowden, Norma and Barbara threatened to 
call the Circuit Clerk and have him call the Sheriff’s 
Department to have “something done about this.” (JA 
211-13, 274, 457-58). Martin dismissed these threats 
and left the scene. (JA 458).  
Later that morning, Deputy Martin spoke with his 
supervising officer, Corporal Chris Hoffman and 
explained his doubts about Simmons’ credibility and 
his opinion that Bowden had not committed any 
crime. (JA 187-89). Regardless, Hoffman ordered 
Deputy Martin to go back to Bowden’s home, read him 
his rights, seize his shotgun, and write a report for the 
unlawful use of a firearm. (JA 189-90). Hoffman told 
Deputy Martin that someone from Barbara Voyles’ 
home had called Howard Wagner, that Wagner had 
called Respondent Lieutenant Colonel Meinberg, who 
then called Respondent Lieutenant Patrick Hawkins, 
who in turn called Hoffman and relayed the order to 
seize the shotgun and draft a probable cause 
statement charging Bowden with the unlawful use of 
a weapon. (JA 190). Hoffman also told Deputy Martin 
to draft the probable cause statement and not worry; 
Hoffman doubted anything would come of it. (JA 197).  
Deputy Martin would not have written and signed 
a probable cause statement had Hoffman not ordered 
him to do so. (JA 193-94, 196-97). Nevertheless, he 
complied with his orders. He drafted the probable 
cause statement averring that he believed probable 
cause existed that Bowden had committed the crime 
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of unlawful use of a weapon. (JA 196, 243). He seized 
Bowden’s shotgun and told Bowden that Deputy 
Martin’s superiors were just trying to “appease Mrs. 
Voyles or whoever over there.” (JA 130). Apparently, 
though, the county’s purpose exceeded appeasement: 
the local prosecutor’s office issued a Complaint and 
Request for Warrant, based on Deputy Martin’s 
affidavit, charging Bowden with the unlawful use of a 
weapon, a Class D felony. (JA 285, 287). A warrant 
was issued for Bowden’s arrest, and he turned himself 
in to the Sheriff’s Department. (JA 131). The Sheriff’s 
Department arrested Bowden and detained him until 
he posted bond. (JA 131). The local prosecutor offered 
a plea deal that both Bowden and his defense attorney 
considered “ridiculous,” but fortunately a jury 
acquitted him after a trial on June 25, 2010. (JA 133). 
Proceedings Below:  In December 2013, Bowden 
filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern 
District of Missouri alleging a deprivation of his 
Fourth Amendment rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 
1983, among other claims, against Respondent 
Deputy Martin, Lieutenant Colonel Steve Meinberg, 
Lieutenant Patrick Hawkins, Corporal Chris 
Hoffman, and Circuit Clerk Wes Wagner, and 
conspiracy and other claims against Respondents 
Benjamin Simmons and Aaron Gyurica. App 5a. 
Defendants moved for summary judgment on the 
basis of qualified immunity, which the District Court 
denied.  App 6a. The District Court found that a 
genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether 
Deputy Martin had probable cause that Bowden had 
committed a crime, such that Bowden’s claim merited 
a jury trial. App 6a. 
 Respondents filed an interlocutory appeal to 
the Eighth Circuit appealing the denial of qualified 
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immunity. The Eighth Circuit panel reversed and 
remanded, concluding that the Respondents were 
entitled to qualified immunity against Bowden’s 
Fourth Amendment claims.  App. 9a.  
The court rejected Bowden’s argument that 
Deputy Martin violated Bowden’s Fourth Amendment 
rights by drafting the probable cause statement when 
Deputy Martin knew the facts did not support 
probable cause to arrest Bowden for a crime. The court 
reasoned that “[w]hether probable cause existed…is 
an objective question of law.” Id. at 881.  And then it 
went on to weigh the facts.  A dispute of fact centered 
on whether an objective magistrate would believe 
Bowden shot a gun at the men, based on the men’s 
testimony.  App 8a.  Despite the fact that any 
corrected affidavit would include Officer Martin’s 
evaluation that the men were not credible and that 
there was no probable cause (and in any event, a 
corrected affidavit likely should not have included the 
men’s claims at all), the Eighth Circuit determined 
that an objective magistrate could find as a matter of 
law that Bowdend did shoot at the men.  App. 9a.   
In its weighing of the facts, the court found it 
irrelevant that Deputy Martin’s probable cause 
statement omitted the facts that Simmons and 
Gyurica did not see Bowden fire the shotgun and that 
Bowden said he fired in a direction away from the 
men.  App. 8a. The court concluded that Bowden 
shouting at Simmons and Gyurica and leaves falling 
above them could by itself support a reasonable 
objective belief that Bowden shot at the men, and thus 
probable cause that Bowden had committed a crime.  
Id.  Since Deputy Martin purportedly did not violate 
Bowden’s Fourth Amendment right against 
unreasonable seizure by including false information 
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in his probable cause report, Bowden’s conspiracy 
claim failed as well.  App. 9a. The Eighth Circuit 
subsequently denied panel and en banc rehearing. 
App 33a. 
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT 
I. THE CIRCUITS ARE DEEPLY DIVIDED ON 
HOW TO APPLY FRANKS v. DELAWARE  IN 
CIVIL RIGHTS CASES. 
This case is about preserving the jury’s role as a 
factfinder in civil rights cases when a defendant 
claims qualified immunity despite making 
deliberately misleading statements or omissions in a 
warrant affidavit.  Two circuits—the Second and the 
Third—have long held that whether a hypothetical, 
corrected affidavit would support probable cause is a 
question of fact.  Consequently, when a defendant 
claims qualified immunity at the summary judgment 
stage, those courts require that all inferences be 
resolved in the plaintiff’s favor and grant immunity 
only if there is no genuine dispute that the magistrate 
still would have granted the warrant.  In the Ninth 
Circuit, the affiant’s deliberate or reckless disregard 
for the truth is a fact question, but probable cause is 
exclusively a question of law.  At the summary 
judgment stage, courts in that circuit reconstruct an 
affidavit to correct any errors that the plaintiff 
identified as being at least recklessly false through a 
“substantial showing” before conclusively resolving 
probable cause.  Other circuits take an intermediate 
approach.  The Fifth, the Sixth and the Seventh 
Circuits ask whether any reasonable jury could find a 
set of deliberate or reckless misstatements or 
omissions that would not support probable cause.   
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In reversing the district court, the Eighth Circuit 
drew several critical inferences in the defendant 
affiant’s favor.   The Ninth Circuit might have been 
able to reach that same outcome because the court has 
exclusive say over how a magistrate might have 
interpreted a warrant.  Whether the Fifth, the Sixth 
or the Seventh Circuits’ standard would have 
permitted the same outcome is less clear; at least one 
of the Eighth Circuit’s conclusions in this case would 
be expressly foreclosed by earlier precedents from the 
Fifth and Seventh Circuits.  In the Second and Third 
Circuits, however, the same conclusions reached by 
the court below would have required submitting 
Bowden’s case to a jury. 
A. The Circuits disagree about the proper role 
of a jury in resolving Fourth Amendment 
claims predicated upon misleading warrant 
affidavits. 
In Franks v. Delaware, this Court established the 
limited circumstances in which a criminal defendant 
could challenge the validity of a search warrant based 
on an applicant’s misleading affidavit.  438 U.S. 154, 
171-72 (1978).  A criminal defendant is entitled to a 
suppression hearing only if he can support a specific 
allegation of the affiant’s deliberate or reckless 
falsehoods with an offer of proof.  Id. at 171.  
Moreover, a suppression hearing is required only 
when these falsehoods are so material that the rest of 
the affidavit’s content is insufficient to support a 
finding of probable cause.  Id. at 171-72.  When the 
defendant ultimately establishes the affiant’s 
deliberate falsehood or reckless disregard for the 
truth by a preponderance of the evidence, at the 
hearing and the affidavit’s remaining content is 
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insufficient, the fruits of the search must be excluded.  
Id. at 156. 
While Franks sets forth a clear rule of criminal 
procedure, the Court did not expressly address 
whether its test would apply in civil suits.  
Nevertheless, the circuit courts generally borrow the 
Franks test for their rule of decision in civil rights 
suits based on misleading warrant affidavits.  See 
Burke v. Town of Walpole, 405 F.3d 66, 82 (1st Cir. 
2005) (“Appellate courts have consistently held that 
the Franks standard for suppression of evidence 
informs the scope of qualified immunity in a civil 
damages suit against officers who allegedly procure a 
warrant based on an untruthful application.”).  See 
generally Hernandez-Cuevas v. Taylor, 723 F.3d 91, 
99-102 (1st Cir. 2013) (discussing different circuit’s 
approaches to Fourth Amendment malicious 
prosecution claims and the role Franks plays in 
establishing the “kind of reprehensible behavior that 
is indistinguishable from the common law element of 
malice”). 
The circuit courts thus redeveloped the Franks 
test as a rule of decision in civil rights cases and 
decided on their own how that test interacts with the 
standards for summary judgment and qualified 
immunity.  And because they did so without any 
guidance from this Court, their approaches vary 
substantially.  Compare Hervey v. Estes, 65 F.3d 784, 
789 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that the materiality of a 
warrant affidavit’s misstatements or omissions is a 
matter for the court), with Velardi v. Walsh, 40 F.3d 
569, 574 (2d. Cir. 1994) (holding that the weight a 
neutral magistrate would give such information is a 
jury matter).  At its narrowest, the circuits’ 
disagreement centers on the showing a plaintiff must 
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make before he can bring his claim to trial; more 
fundamentally, the circuits disagree about the proper 
role of a jury in deciding these claims.  See Sherwood 
v. Mulvihill, 113 F.3d 396, 401 n.4 (3d Cir. 1997) 
(noting the “tension [that] exists as to the proper role 
of the judge and jury where qualified immunity is 
asserted” in Fourth Amendment malicious 
prosecution claims). 
1.  In both the Second and Third Circuits, juries 
assess the weight a neutral magistrate would have 
assigned to the facts in an affidavit after its 
misstatements and omissions are corrected.  See 
Sherwood, 113 F.3d at 401; Velardi, 40 F.3d at 574.  In 
those courts, qualified immunity shields a warrant 
affiant from liability for his intentional or reckless 
misstatements only if a magistrate would have 
granted a warrant even after viewing the facts in the 
light most favorable to the plaintiff.  See Southerland 
v. City of N.Y., 680 F.3d 127, 144 (2d Cir. 2011). 
The Second Circuit has held that “[t]he 
materiality of a misrepresentation or an omission” in 
a Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim “is 
a mixed question of law and fact.”  Velardi, 40 F.3d at 
574.  Under that court’s precedents, an omission’s 
relevance to the probable cause determination is a 
question of law resolved by the court.  Walczyk v. Rio, 
496 F.3d 139, 158 (2d Cir. 2007).  “‘[T]he weight that 
a neutral magistrate would likely have given such 
information,’ however, is a question for the 
factfinder.”  Southerland, 680 F.3d at 144 (quoting 
Velardi, 40 F.3d at 574); see Golino v. City of New 
Haven, 950 F.3d 864, 872 (2d Cir. 1991).  In essence, 
the factfinder is asked to predict whether the 
magistrate still would have issued a warrant based on 
an affidavit he never read.  See Velardi, 40 F.3d at 574 
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n.1 (“[T]ry[ing] to predict whether a magistrate would 
have found probable cause if he had been presented 
with truthful information . . . is a question of fact 
rather than of law.”). 
The Second Circuit therefore grants qualified 
immunity “only if ‘the evidence, viewed in the light 
most favorable to the plaintiffs, discloses no genuine 
dispute that a magistrate would have issued the 
warrant on the basis of the corrected affidavits.’”  
Southerland, 680 F.3d at 144 (quoting Walczyk, 496 
F.3d at 158).  At the summary judgment stage, any 
genuine doubt over whether the magistrate would 
have issued the warrant must be resolved in favor of 
the nonmovant.  Velardi, 496 F.3d at 574.  So long as 
the affiant’s misstatement or omission was relevant 
and either deliberate or reckless, the plaintiff survives 
a defendant’s motion for summary judgment when 
such a genuine dispute over the magistrate’s decision 
exists.  Id. 
In Sherwood v. Mulvihill, the Third Circuit 
similarly observed that “[t]ypically, the existence of 
probable cause in a section 1983 action is a question 
of fact.”  113 F.3d at 401.  A defendant affiant is 
entitled to summary judgment or qualified immunity 
only “if the evidence, viewed most favorably to the 
plaintiff” would support finding that “that a 
reasonable municipal court judge, presented with the 
corrected affidavit, could not conclude that the 
affidavit was insufficient.”  Id.  The Third Circuit does 
not require submitting “trivial” omissions to the jury 
if they “are not strong enough to undermine a finding 
of probable cause,” see Wilson v. Russo, 212 F.3d 781, 
791-92  (3d Cir. 2000).  But the court insists that 
district courts interpret the record in the light most 
favorable to the plaintiff when an affiant claims 
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qualified immunity.  See, e.g., Reedy v. Evanson, 615 
F.3d 197, 215-16 (3d Cir. 2010) (concluding that the 
district court “erred in its reconstruction of the 
Affidavit because it failed to consistently interpret the 
record in the light most favorable to Reedy and 
instead, contrary to the summary judgment standard, 
occasionally adopted interpretations that were the 
least favorable to Reedy”). 
2.  The Second and the Third Circuits’ application 
of Franks to civil rights cases stands in direct conflict 
to that of the Ninth Circuit.  There, correcting an 
affidavit and determining probable cause is 
exclusively a function of the court.  See Ewing v. City 
of Stockton, 588 F.3d 1218, 1224 (9th Cir. 2009) 
(“[T]he court must determine the materiality of the 
allegedly false statements or omissions.”); Butler v. 
Elle, 281 F.3d 1014, 1024 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Materiality 
is for the court, state of mind is for the jury.”).   
“The practical effect” of the Ninth Circuit’s rule “is 
to reserve to the court the issue of the materiality of 
the false statements.”  Hervey, 65 F.3d at 789.  On the 
defendant affiant’s motion for summary judgment, the 
district court adopts a reconstructed affidavit, 
correcting facts that the plaintiff “demonstrate[s] 
through a substantial showing of evidence were 
falsely included in the [original] affidavit.”  See id. at 
790.1  The court then determines “whether the 
                                            
1 Significantly, the Ninth Circuit did not suggest in Hervey that 
it would draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor 
when evaluating his “substantial showing” at the summary 
judgment stage.  See 65 F.3d at 790.  Indeed, the court did not 
discuss the ordinary standard at summary judgment at all.  The 
court instead noted that when a plaintiff alleges a Fourth 
Amendment claim similar to a Franks claim, he must meet a 
“heightened pleading standard” and a “still higher standard to 
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affidavit, once corrected and supplemented, 
establishes probable cause.”  Ewing, 588 F.3d at 1224. 
3.  The rest of the circuits fall somewhere between 
the purely legal determination of the Ninth Circuit 
and the primarily factual determination of the Second 
and the Third Circuits.  Some circuits acknowledge 
that their case law in this area is less than clear.  See, 
e.g., Hale v. Kart, 396 F.3d 721, 728 (6th Cir. 2005) 
(“We admit that some of these Sixth Circuit cases are 
confusing and many of the factual recitals in them do 
not lend themselves to a clear understanding of 
exactly what facts were in dispute.”).  But in general, 
these other circuits require that factfinders resolve a 
variety of questions including: 
 Whether the affiant made statements that 
were false or misleading when applying for 
a warrant, see, e.g., Hart v. Mannina, 798 
F.3d 578, 583 (7th Cir. 2015) (“A reasonable 
jury [could not] find that the lead detective 
. . . made false or misleading statements in 
her probable cause affidavit.”); 
 Whether the affiant reasonably relied in 
good faith on statements that later proved 
false, see, e.g., Clanton v. Cooper, 129 F.3d 
1147, 1154 (10th Cir. 1997) (noting that 
triable issues of fact remained where 
plaintiff alleged that a defendant affiant 
deliberately relied on a confession he knew 
to be false); and 
 Whether the affiant’s misleading 
statements were made knowingly or with 
reckless disregard for the truth, see, e.g., 
                                            
survive summary judgment.” Id. at 788. 
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Betker v. Gomez, 692 F.3d 854, 860 (7th 
Cir. 2012) (“[A] reasonable jury could find 
that Officer Gomez knowingly or with 
reckless disregard for the truth made false 
statements in his affidavit.”). 
After the factfinder resolves these issues, the 
court determines whether the corrected warrant 
would have supported probable cause.  Hale, 396 F.3d 
at 728. At the summary judgment stage, a court can 
grant summary judgment only if all of the challenged 
misstatements would be immaterial.  See, e.g., 
Betker, 692 F.3d at 861-62 (analyzing whether a 
corrected affidavit would support probable cause in 
light of those misstatements or omissions a jury might 
reasonably have found); Kerns v. Bader, 663 F.3d 
1173, 1188 (10th Cir. 2011) (requiring that courts 
excise all alleged false statements and insert alleged 
omissions before reviewing the corrected affidavit for 
probable cause). 
In the Fifth Circuit, for instance, juries are 
responsible for resolving the “facts relied upon to show 
probable cause” while judges decide the ultimate 
issue.  See Garris v. Rowland, 678 F.2d 1264, 1270 
(5th Cir. 1982).  While courts may address whether 
probable cause exists when the evidence is not in 
dispute, factual disputes “must be resolved by the jury 
before controlling legal principles can be applied.”  Id. 
Likewise, in the Sixth Circuit, “probable cause 
determinations are legal determinations that should 
be made by a court.”  Hale, 396 F.3d at 728.  A plaintiff 
can survive a defendant affiant’s motion for summary 
judgment on grounds of qualified immunity if a 
genuine factual dispute about the warrant affidavit’s 
contents exists.  See id. (“[A] jury trial is appropriate 
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where reasonable disputes of material fact exist on 
facts underlying a probable cause determination.”).  
But even if the plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claim 
proceeds to trial, “the jury does not decide whether the 
facts it has found are legally sufficient to amount to 
probable cause or entitlement to qualified immunity.”  
Id. 
The Seventh Circuit’s approach differs slightly in 
that courts can grant qualified immunity even where 
a factual dispute exists—so long as the evidence is 
viewed and inferences are resolved in the plaintiff’s 
favor.  See, e.g., Molina ex rel. Molina v. Cooper, 325 
F.3d 963, 968-69 (7th Cir. 2003) (agreeing that an 
informant’s statement should be disregarded in a 
corrected affidavit but determining that probable 
cause still would have existed).   A statement or 
omission’s materiality is a question of law, while the 
statement’s actual veracity and an affiant’s state of 
mind are both questions of fact.  See, e.g., Betker, 692 
F.3d at 861-62 (7th Cir. 2012) (“A reasonable jury 
could find that Officer Gomez knowingly or with 
reckless disregard for the truth made false or 
misleading statements. So we must decide whether 
probable cause would have existed . . . absent those 
disputed statements.”).   At the summary judgment 
stage, a defendant affiant is entitled to qualified 
immunity unless the plaintiff shows a “reasonable 
probability” that the inclusion of omitted information 
would have led to a different outcome.  See Molina ex 
rel. Molina v. Cooper, 325 F.3d 963, 970 (7th Cir. 
2003) (citing United States v. McNeese, 901 F.2d 585, 
595 (7th Cir. 1990)). 
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B. In either the Second or the Third Circuits, 
the conclusions reached below would entitle 
Bowden to a jury trial. 
The lower court’s conclusion that 
“[c]ircumstantial evidence . . . could lead a man of 
reasonable caution to infer” a crime had been 
committed,”  App. 8a., would have been sufficient on 
its face to send Bowden’s case to a jury in either the 
Second or the Third Circuits.  If a reasonable person 
could infer that this evidence indicated that Petitioner 
fired at the apparent trespassers, one could also infer 
that it indicated no such thing.  Where two or more 
inferences are reasonably possible, the Second and the 
Third Circuits instruct that the case must be 
determined at trial.  See Southerland, 680 F.3d at 144  
(observing that qualified immunity is appropriate 
only if there is “no genuine dispute that a magistrate 
would have issued the warrant); Sherwood, 113 F.3d 
at 401 (noting that while probable cause is a question 
of fact, a court may resolve the question only if the 
evidence could not support concluding that the 
corrected affidavit was insufficient). 
The difference between “would” and “could” here 
is, practically speaking, the difference between actual 
probable cause and arguable probable cause.  
Notwithstanding a warrant affiant’s deliberate or 
reckless misstatements or omission, the Eighth 
Circuit will grant entitled to qualified immunity “if he 
had ‘merely arguable probable cause,’ which is a 
mistaken but objectively reasonable belief the suspect 
committed a criminal offense.”  Dowell v. Lincoln 
Cnty., 762 F.3d 770, 777 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting 
McCabe v. Parker, 608 F.3d 1068, 1078 (8th Cir. 
2010)).  But by insisting that “summary judgment is 
inappropriate in doubtful cases,” Velardi, 740 F.3d at 
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574, the Second and Third Circuits require actual 
probable cause to grant summary judgment.2  See 
generally McColley v. Cnty of Rensselaer, 740 F.3d 
817, 831 (2d Cir. 2014) (Calabresi, J., concurring) 
(noting that granting qualified immunity at summary 
judgment whenever probable cause is debatable 
would “conflict[] with the clear holding of Velardi that 
‘doubtful cases’ must be sent to a jury”). 
As Judge Calabresi noted in McColley, arguable 
probable cause necessarily exists whenever 
reasonable people could disagree about the existence 
of actual probable cause.  Id.  And the consequence of 
granting qualified immunity whenever arguable 
probable cause exists is that “no case of this sort 
should ever go to a jury.”  Id.   
Functionally, granting qualified immunity on 
arguable qualified immunity reverses the standard of 
summary judgment, requiring the court to draw 
reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.  
Cf. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158-59 
(1970) (requiring that all reasonable inferences be 
drawn in favor of the nonmoving party at summary 
judgment).  “[I]ntroducing reasonableness as a 
separate step . . . give[s] defendants a second bite at 
the immunity apple, thereby thwarting a careful 
balance that the Supreme Court has struck.” Walczyk 
                                            
2 A line of Second Circuit cases starting with Escalera v. Lunn suggested 
that arguable probable cause is the appropriate standard in that court.  See 
361 F.3d 737, 744 (2d Cir. 2004); see also McColley, 740 F.3d at 829 
(Calabresi, J., concurring) (“Escalera is important . . . for having first made 
‘arguable probable cause’ part of the corrected affidavits doctrine in our 
Circuit.”).  But the court limited Escalera to prevent “the doctrine of 
arguable probable cause [from] swallow[ing] the entire rule of qualified 
immunity as well as the related limitation on our jurisdiction.”  See 
McColley 740 F.3d at 825-26 (opinion of the court). 
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v. Rio, 496 F.3d 139, 169 (2d Cir. 2007) (Sotomayor, 
J., concurring). 
Additionally, the court below resolved an 
inference in the defendants’ favor when it concluded 
that Bowden’s own statement to officer Martin could 
be considered inculpatory.  See App. 8a.  By contrast, 
the Third Circuit explained in Reedy v. Evanson that 
such an inference ran contrary to the summary 
judgment standard.  See 615 F.3d at 215-18 (“[T]he 
[district court] erred in deciding that certain facts 
were inculpatory when they were either irrelevant or 
even exculpatory.”). 
In Reedy, the court ruled that a district court must 
draw all inferences in the plaintiff’s favor when 
interpreting a reconstructed affidavit at the summary 
judgment stage.   Id. at 215.  In that case, an officer 
applied for a warrant to arrest a victim for allegedly 
fabricating her rape.  See id. at 202-04, 208.  After the 
rapist confessed to the attack and Reedy was released, 
she sued the officer for filing a misleading affidavit in 
obtaining the arrest warrant.  Id. at 209.  At summary 
judgment, the district court concluded that while a 
reasonable jury could find that the officer’s affidavit 
was deliberately or recklessly false, probable cause 
could still exist if certain facts were interpreted as 
inculpatory.  Id. at 214-15.  Reversing, the Third 
Circuit explained that “the District Court erred in its 
application of the summary judgment standard” by 
interpreting facts as inculpatory even though the 
“conduct was susceptible of innocent explanation.”  Id. 
at 218 (internal quotations omitted). 
In this case, the Eighth Circuit improperly 
interpreted Bowden’s statement as inculpatory under 
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Mo. Rev. Stat. § 571.030.1(4) (2009).3  See App. 8a.  
This inference was simply unwarranted.  Critically, 
the statute requires that the defendant exhibit the 
weapon “in an angry or threatening manner.”  § 
571.030.1(4).  But as even the Eighth Circuit 
recognized, Bowden’s statement does not indicate that 
he was angry or threatening; rather, it suggested only 
that “he purposefully fired the gun” in the opposite 
direction of the apparent trespassers and that “he 
thought their behavior was suspicious.” App. 9a. 
Implicit in the Eighth Circuit’s holding on this 
issue is the conclusion that there would always be 
probable cause to believe that any discharge of a 
firearm was angry or threatening.  Sensibly, Missouri 
state courts have never construed the statute so 
broadly—and the cases relied upon by the Eighth 
Circuit do not suggest they would.  In State v. Rogers, 
for instance, a court concluded that the defendant 
violated § 571.030.1(4) by firing into the air because 
the “[d]efendant testified that the first shot was 
intended to scare the entire crowd of people.”  976 
S.W.2d 529, 532 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998) (emphasis 
added).  In State v. Johnson, the court affirmed the 
defendant’s conviction because after a loud, angry 
confrontation, he shot the complaining witness’s car 
four times while she watched.  See 964 S.W.2d 465, 
467 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998).  Bowden’s statement to 
Martin did not carry a similar, necessary implication 
that he was angry or intended to threaten the 
apparent trespassers—indeed, the purported victims 
                                            
3 The statute at issue prohibits “[1] exhibit[ing], [2] in the 
presence of one or more persons, [3] any weapon readily capable 
of lethal use [4] in an angry or threatening manner” as the crime 
“unlawful use of weapons.”  Mo. Rev. Stat. 571.030.1(4) (2009). 
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did not interpret it as a threat at the time—and to the 
extent the defendants might argue that it could carry 
that implication, that is a question for the factfinder. 
C. While the court below concluded that 
Martin’s belief about the apparent 
trespassers’ credibility was irrelevant, the 
Fifth, the Seventh, and the Tenth Circuits 
regard this as a triable issue of fact. 
The Eighth Circuit’s holding below would not 
survive scrutiny even under the intermediate 
standards employed by the Fifth, the Seventh, and the 
Tenth Circuits.  The Eighth Circuit disregarded 
arguments crucial to Bowden’s case, concluding that 
Officer Martin’s admission that his affidavit relied 
exclusively on a witness statement he did not believe 
was simply irrelevant. 
Much of Bowden’s complaint is without 
merit, because [they] focus[ ] on Martin's 
subjective beliefs. There was no falsehood 
in Martin's report that “[a]ccording to the 
victim's ... Bowden shoot at them,” because 
this was an accurate report of what 
Simmons and Gyurica told him. That 
Martin personally did not believe the men 
was not relevant to the existence of 
probable cause, so the omission of Martin's 
subjective belief did not violate the Fourth 
Amendment. 
Appendix Citation (807 F.3d at 882) 
That conclusion directly conflicts with the 
precedents of the Fifth, the Seventh, and the Tenth 
Circuits—as well as this Court’s opinion in Franks. 
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In the Seventh Circuit, not only is an affiant’s 
subjective belief about a witness statement’s 
credibility relevant, but “[p]olice officers have a duty 
to reveal ‘serious doubts’ about an informant's 
testimony.”  Molina, 325 F.3d at 970.  Although the 
officer is under no obligation to reveal less-than-
serious doubts, see id., in this case, Martin’s initial 
decision not to charge Bowden—and especially his 
subsequent admissions that he did not find the 
apparent trespassers credible—should raise at least a 
triable issue as to whether his doubt was serious 
enough that it should have been disclosed to a 
magistrate. 
In the Fifth Circuit, “[t]he reliability of the sources 
for [an officer’s] beliefs” presents a factual question 
resolved by the jury.  Garris, 678 F.2d at 1271.  In that 
case, a warrant affiant misrepresented certain facts 
about an apparent, attempted child abduction as 
being within his personal knowledge.  Id. at 1267-68.  
The officer in that case had not actually witnessed the 
attempted crime or spoken to anyone who had; rather, 
he later claimed that he had heard the information 
from a partner, who had heard it from a school 
principal, who had heard it from a parent.  See id. at 
1267.  After the suit, substantial disagreement arose 
both over who had told what to whom and over how 
reasonable it was to rely on the information.  See id. 
at 1271.  Affirming judgment against the officers, the 
Fifth Circuit agreed that this dispute presented a 
factual question for the jury.  See id. 
In Clanton v. Cooper, the Tenth Circuit 
acknowledged that whether a warrant affiant relied 
in bad faith on a confession he knew was false 
presented a triable question of fact.  129 F.3d at 1155-
56.  There, an affiant’s warrant “was predicated on an 
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oral statement by Clanton’s alleged accomplice, who 
later testified that his statement was coerced by” the 
affiant.  Id. at 1150.  The Fifth Circuit acknowledged 
that if the affiant “relied in good faith on statements . 
. . that turned out to be false, there would be no 
Franks violation.”  Id. at 1155.  But it further 
concluded that if the affiant “knowingly and 
intentionally swore to the veracity” of the confession 
“while knowing it to be false,” that would be a “classic 
Franks violation.”  Id.  Because only a jury could 
determine whether he had relied in good faith on the 
confession, the court denied qualified immunity.  Id. 
at 1155-56. 
The Eighth Circuit’s holding below flies in the face 
of the reasoned opinions of its sister courts.  The court 
below not only implied that officers have no duty to 
alert magistrates as to their serious doubts about the 
statements underpinning their warrant affidavits—
the court concluded that this information is 
irrelevant. 
As this Court noted in Franks, the truthfulness of 
an affidavit does not require that “that every fact 
recited in the warrant affidavit is necessarily correct,” 
but “surely it is to be ‘truthful’ in the sense that the 
information put forth is believed or appropriately 
accepted by the affiant as true.”  438 U.S. at 154 
(emphasis added).  The Eighth Circuit’s conclusion to 
the contrary is plainly wrong. 
II. THIS CASE PRESENTS A QUESTION OF 
EXCEPTIONAL IMPORTANCE. 
This case presents this Court the opportunity to 
provide needed clarification the interaction between 
the summary judgment and qualified immunity 
standards in cases involving corrected affidavits. This 
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clarification will prevent courts from granting 
qualified immunity to defendants guilty of 
unreasonable misconduct and thereby depriving 
citizens of the ability to vindicate their constitutional 
rights.  
Sadly, police perjury, particularly in warrant 
affidavits, is a common phenomenon. Scholarly 
evidence suggests that the warrant application 
process does not effectively deter police perjury in 
warrant affidavits. Stephen W. Gard, Bearing False 
Witness: Perjured Affidavits and the Fourth 
Amendment, 41 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 445, 447 (2008). In 
fact, as Professor Gard recognizes, “substantial 
evidence demonstrates that police perjury is so 
common that scholars describe it as a “subcultural 
norm rather than an individual aberration.” Id. at 
448. “[O]verwhelming anecdotal evidence” suggests 
that widespread police perjury occurs most often in 
pretrial suppression hearings litigating defense 
claims of police constitutional violations. See Michael 
Goldsmith, Reforming the Civil Rights Act of 1871: 
The Problem of Police Perjury, 80 Notre Dame L. Rev. 
1259, 1266 (2005). The widespread occurrence of 
police perjury requires federal courts to have a clear 
standard for evaluating qualified immunity in civil 
rights claims resulting from perjurious affidavits—
one that deters police misconduct by permitting 
meritorious claims to proceed to a jury trial.  
However, substantial confusion and incorrect 
interpretation of the qualified immunity standard in 
the lower courts has barred the deserving civil rights 
plaintiff from the jury. In a recent article, Professor 
Karen Blum argues that judges deciding civil rights 
suits often misconstrue the summary judgment 
standard and resolve factual disputes themselves out 
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of a desire to protect government officials from the 
hassles of trial that qualified immunity is designed to 
prevent, but that in doing so, the judge usurps the role 
of the jury. Karen M. Blum, Section 1983 Litigation: 
The Maze, the Mud, and the Madness, 23 Wm. & Mary 
Bill Rts. J. 913, 940-41 (2015). In other words, 
“[r]unaway judges are more common than runaway 
jurors.” Id. at 941.  Professor Alan Chen argues that 
this “central paradox” in qualified immunity doctrine, 
the desire to protect officials from baseless suits while 
still protecting citizens’ rights, “complicates the 
analysis in ways that make the doctrine not only 
internally inconsistent, but also extraordinarily 
difficult and costly to administer.” Alan K. Chen, The 
Facts About Qualified Immunity, 55 Emory L.J. 229, 
230-31 (2006). 
The Third Circuit has noted that this “tension” 
surrounding the respective roles of the judge and jury 
is particularly acute in cases involving corrected 
affidavits: this Court has classified the availability of 
qualified immunity as a question of law, but many 
courts have viewed the existence of probable cause to 
support a warrant as a question of fact.  Sherwood, 
113 F.3d at 401. As the Third Circuit has 
recognized,“[t]his [tension] may prove problematic in 
attempting to resolve immunity issues in the early 
stages of litigation where a genuine and material 
factual dispute exists concerning probable cause.” Id. 
Bowden’s case presents the opportunity to formulate 
a clearer standard for parsing the currently murky 
interplay between summary judgment and qualified 
immunity in cases involving warrant affidavits.  
The current absence of a clear standard continues 
to cause inconsistent lower court decisions in 
corrected affidavit cases. Concurring in the Second 
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Circuit’s denial of qualified immunity in McColley, a 
case which yielded three opinions, Judge Calabresi 
noted that “our precedents in this area are as divided 
as our panel.” McColley, 740 F.3d at 826 (Calabresi, 
J., concurring). Judge Calabresi succinctly 
summarized the confusion surrounding corrected 
affidavits, specifically within Second Circuit case law, 
but his observations apply equally to the inter-Circuit 
split: some cases have held that the weight a 
magistrate would give omitted evidence is a question 
of fact; if reasonable factfinders could disagree, 
summary judgment is inappropriate; but if reasonable 
factfinders could disagree, then by definition arguable 
probable cause exists. Id.  Professor Gard attributes 
this inconsistency to an “acute” lack of guidance for 
lower courts resulting from still-unresolved questions 
after Franks and subsequent major developments in 
both Fourth Amendment and civil rights law. Gard, 
supra, at 446. Left without “coherent and consistent” 
standards, “the only area where lower courts have 
been consistent exists in erecting inappropriate 
barriers to the vindication of the serious wrongs 
perpetrated by perjured warrant affidavits.” Id.  
This case illustrates how the lack of guidance on 
the interplay between the standards creates unjust 
results and deprives a deserving plaintiff of a jury 
trial. The Court has long held that good faith must be 
touchstone of Fourth Amendment. Franks, 438 U.S. 
at 164 (“[W]e derive our ground from language of the 
Warrant Clause itself, which surely takes the affiant's 
good faith as its premise.”). However, as Professor 
Gard observes, lower courts have lost sight of this 
original focus and have applied the exclusionary rule 
and qualified immunity in cases of bad faith,  thereby 
“erect[ing] inappropriate legal barriers to the 
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eradication of perjurious warrant affidavits.” Gard, 
supra, at 484.  
In this case, the Eighth Circuit erected such an 
inappropriate barrier: the defendant openly admitted 
bad faith conduct by the police in causing Bowden’s 
arrest without probable cause. Even worse, the 
violation of Bowden’s constitutional rights arose, not 
from the isolated bad faith of one police officer, but 
from a concerted conspiracy reaching the entire local 
police chain of command and an elected county 
official. Yet rather than allow a jury to evaluate the 
facts surrounding such flagrant police misconduct, the 
Eighth Circuit conducted its own re-evaluation of the 
facts based on its misunderstanding of the summary 
judgment and qualified immunity standards. In doing 
so, the Eighth Circuit prevented Bowden from 
vindicating his Fourth Amendment rights.  
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the petition should be 
granted, the judgment below should be reversed, and 
the case should be remanded for further proceedings. 
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______________ 
 
COLLOTON, Circuit Judge.  
Thomas Bowden sued several law enforcement 
officers and the county clerk from Jefferson County, 
Missouri, alleging, among other claims, that they 
violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment. 
Bowden asserts that Deputy Sheriff Vernon Martin 
drafted, and the remaining defendants caused to be 
drafted, an affidavit in support of a request for an 
3a  
arrest warrant that led to Bowden’s seizure without 
probable cause.  
The defendants moved for summary judgment on 
the Fourth Amendment claims based on qualified 
immunity. The district court denied the motion, but 
we conclude that the facts taken in the light most 
favorable to Bowden do not show a violation of his 
constitutional rights. We therefore reverse the 
decision of the district court.  
I. 
In a qualified immunity appeal, we have 
jurisdiction to resolve purely legal issues based on the 
facts assumed by the district court, or facts likely 
assumed by the court, when the record is viewed in 
the light most favorable to the non-movant. Johnson 
v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 313, 319 (1995). We therefore 
recite the facts in the light most favorable to Bowden.  
Benjamin Simmons and Aaron Gyurica were 
fishing on a bridge near Bowden’s property in rural 
Missouri in 2009. Bowden shouted to the men to 
identify themselves, and then fired a shotgun from his 
back deck when they failed to respond. After the 
gunshot, Bowden and Simmons engaged in a heated 
verbal altercation, during which Bowden was holding 
his shotgun. Bowden and Simmons each called the 
police, and Martin was dispatched to investigate.  
Martin first spoke with Simmons and Gyurica at 
the residence of Simmons’s grandmother, Barbara 
Voyles. Simmons and Gyurica reported their belief 
that Bowden shot at them on the bridge. They 
explained that they heard a gunshot and then saw 
leaves falling in front of them after the blast. Voyles 
stated that she could call Howard Wagner, the 
Jefferson County circuit clerk, to see what Voyles 
4a  
could do.  
Martin next spoke with Bowden. Bowden 
admitted that he had fired his shotgun, but said that 
he shot the weapon in a direction away from Simmons 
and Gyurica. Martin relayed these circumstances by 
telephone to his supervisor, Corporal Chris Hoffman. 
Hoffman ordered Martin to seize the shotgun and to 
draft a statement averring that there was probable 
cause that Bowden had unlawfully used a weapon.  
According to Martin, Hoffman informed him that 
a call was placed from Voyles’s residence to Howard 
Wagner, the circuit clerk, who contacted Lieutenant 
Colonel Steve Meinberg, who in turn contacted 
Lieutenant Patrick Hawkins. In Martin’s account, 
Hawkins then directed Hoffman that Martin should 
be ordered to seize the shotgun and draft the probable 
cause statement. Bowden initially named circuit clerk 
Howard Wagner as a defendant, but later substituted 
the county clerk, Wes Wagner, after discovery 
revealed that two calls were made from Voyles’s 
residence to Wes Wagner’s office.  
After receiving direction from Hoffman, Martin 
returned to Bowden’s residence, seized his shotgun, 
and obtained a written statement from him. Bowden 
explained that he had fired in a direction away from 
Simmons and Gyurica after they failed to identify 
themselves, because he thought their actions were 
“suspicious.” Martin also obtained written statements 
from Simmons and Gyurica. They reiterated their 
belief that Bowden shot at them on the bridge.  
Martin then drafted a probable cause statement, 
which read:  
1. I have probable cause to believe that . . . 
[Bowden] committed one or more criminal 
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offense(s):  
Unlawful Use of a Weapon  
2. The facts supporting this belief are as 
follows:  
According to the victim’s [sic], they reported 
that they parked their pick up truck on a low 
water bridge in the area of [Bowden’s 
address], to fish off the bridge when a local 
resident Thomas Bowden shoot [sic] at them 
with his shotgun.  
App. 243. Martin later admitted that he did not 
personally believe the claims of Simmons and Gyurica 
that Bowden had fired a weapon in their direction. 
Martin also said that he did not think the facts 
established that Bowden had violated any Missouri 
law.  
The Jefferson County prosecutor obtained an 
arrest warrant based on Martin’s probable cause 
statement. Bowden learned that the warrant had 
been issued, and turned himself in. A Missouri court 
then held a preliminary hearing and determined that 
there was probable cause to believe that Bowden 
violated Mo. Rev. Stat. § 571.030.1(4). Under that 
statute, a person commits the crime of unlawful use of 
weapons if he “knowingly . . . [e]xhibits, in the 
presence of one or more persons, any weapon readily 
capable of lethal use in an angry or threatening 
manner.” Bowden was acquitted following a jury trial 
in 2010.  
Bowden filed his amended complaint in this case 
against Martin, Meinberg, Hawkins, Hoffman, and 
Wes Wagner in December 2013. The amended 
complaint alleged, as relevant on appeal, that the 
defendants violated Bowden’s rights under the Fourth 
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Amendment by causing him to be arrested without 
probable cause. The defendants moved for summary 
judgment, arguing that they were entitled to qualified 
immunity and, alternatively, that collateral estoppel 
barred Bowden from relitigating the Missouri court’s 
determination that there was probable cause to 
believe Bowden violated Missouri law.  
The district court denied the motions for summary 
judgment. The court ruled that collateral estoppel did 
not apply, because Bowden now sought to challenge 
the “integrity” of the evidence presented at the 
preliminary cause hearing. After noting that Martin’s 
affidavit asserted probable cause to arrest Bowden 
even though Martin did not believe that probable 
cause existed, the court denied summary judgment 
because there was “a genuine issue of material fact 
regarding the existence of probable cause.” The court 
ruled that Martin was not entitled to qualified 
immunity because “the qualified immunity inquiry is 
identical to the probable cause question.” The district 
court did not specifically address the qualified 
immunity of the other defendants, but denied their 
motion for summary judgment on that issue as well. 
All of the officials appeal the district court’s denial of 
qualified immunity, and all but Martin appeal the 
court’s ruling on collateral estoppel.  
II. 
Bowden first challenges our jurisdiction over this 
appeal. We have jurisdiction over interlocutory 
appeals of orders denying qualified immunity if the 
appeal seeks review of a purely legal issue. Johnson, 
515 U.S. at 313. We do not have jurisdiction to review 
“which facts a party may, or may not, be able to prove 
at trial.” Id. In this case, the defendants contend that 
when the facts are viewed in the light most favorable 
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to Bowden, they did not violate Bowden’s clearly 
established rights under the Fourth Amendment. 
This is a purely legal issue over which we have 
jurisdiction. Id.; Sherbrooke v. City of Pelican Rapids, 
513 F.3d 809, 813 (8th Cir. 2008). We review de novo 
the district court’s decision on qualified immunity, 
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to 
Bowden. Doe v. Flaherty, 623 F.3d 577, 583 (8th Cir. 
2010).  
Public officials are immune from suit if “their 
conduct does not violate clearly established statutory 
or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person 
would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 
800, 818 (1982). A plaintiff seeking damages under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 must show first that the defendant’s 
conduct violated a constitutional right and, second, 
that the right was clearly established. Pearson v. 
Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009). In this case, we 
elect to consider the questions in that order.  
Bowden first argues that Martin violated his 
rights under the Fourth Amendment by averring that 
he “ha[d] probable cause to believe” that Bowden 
committed an offense when Martin did not actually 
believe that there was probable cause. Whether 
probable cause existed, however, is an objective 
question of law. Martin’s subjective belief is irrelevant 
to whether his affidavit included sufficient facts to 
establish probable cause. Indeed, we have upheld the 
lawfulness of an arrest based on probable cause even 
where the arresting officers testified that they 
believed probable cause was lacking. Warren v. City 
of Lincoln, Neb., 864 F.2d 1436, 1439-41 (8th Cir. 
1989). Martin’s averment that he “ha[d] probable 
cause to believe” that Bowden committed an offense 
was thus not a false statement, because the assertion 
set forth a legal conclusion not a statement of 
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historical fact.  
Bowden also argues that Martin intentionally or 
recklessly included false statements in, and omitted 
facts from, other portions of the probable cause 
statement. Much of Bowden’s complaint is without 
merit, because it focuses on Martin’s subjective 
beliefs. There was no falsehood in Martin’s report that 
“[a]ccording to the victim’s . . . Bowden shoot at them,” 
because this was an accurate report of what Simmons 
and Gyurica told him. That Martin personally did not 
believe the men was not relevant to the existence of 
probable cause, so the omission of Martin’s subjective 
belief did not violate the Fourth Amendment.  
Bowden does complain about the omission of two 
historical facts: (1) that Simmons and Gyurica did not 
actually see Bowden fire his shotgun and (2) that 
Bowden told Martin that he fired the shotgun in a 
direction away from Simmons and Gyurica. Even 
assuming for the sake of analysis that Martin 
intentionally or recklessly omitted these facts from his 
affidavit, there was no violation of the Fourth 
Amendment. If we reconstruct a hypothetical affidavit 
that includes these additional facts, see Hawkins v. 
Gage County, Neb., 759 F.3d 951, 959 (8th Cir. 2014), 
there was still probable cause to believe that Bowden 
committed an offense. That Simmons and Gyurica 
were not looking at Bowden when he fired does not 
establish that Bowden was innocent. Circumstantial 
evidence of Bowden shouting at the men and leaves 
falling from trees above them after the gunshot could 
lead a man of reasonable caution to infer that the gun 
was fired at the fishermen. Bowden’s denial merely 
created a credibility question; it did not destroy 
probable cause.  
Even if Bowden’s account had been included and 
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believed, moreover, there was still probable cause to 
believe that an offense was committed. The Missouri 
statute does not require proof that a defendant fired a 
weapon at another person. It is an offense knowingly 
to “[e]xhibit[]” the firearm in the “presence” of another 
person “in an angry or threatening manner” when the 
weapon is “readily capable of lethal use.” Mo. Rev. 
Stat. § 571.030.1(4). While Bowden denied that he 
fired his shotgun at the men on the bridge, he 
admitted that he purposefully fired the gun from his 
property nearby because the men did not identify 
themselves and he thought their behavior was 
suspicious. App. 245. There was probable cause to 
believe that Bowden knowingly “exhibited” the 
shotgun in the presence of the fishermen when he 
fired it, see State v. Johnson, 964 S.W.2d 465, 468 
(Mo. Ct. App. 1998), that the exhibition was “angry or 
threatening” even if the gun was not aimed at the 
fishermen, see State v. Rogers, 976 S.W.2d 529, 532 
(Mo. Ct. App. 1998), and that the weapon was “readily 
capable of lethal use” even if it had not yet been so 
used. See State v. Wright, 382 S.W.3d 902, 904-05 
(Mo. 2012).  
Because we conclude that Martin did not violate 
the Fourth Amendment, the alleged conspiracy by the 
remaining defendants to cause Martin’s conduct also 
does not amount to a constitutional violation. 
Slusarchuk v. Hoff, 346 F.3d 1178, 1183 (8th Cir. 
2003). We need not address the separate question of 
whether any infringed right was clearly established, 
although we note that the qualified immunity inquiry 
is not identical to the question of probable cause: an 
official enjoys qualified immunity for an objectively 
reasonable judgment about probable cause that turns 
out to be incorrect. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 
635, 643-44 (1987). We also do not consider whether 
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there would be jurisdiction to review the district 
court’s decision on collateral estoppel, and we express 
no view on the merits of that issue.  
* * * 
For the foregoing reasons, the order of the district 
court, R. Doc. 85, is reversed, and the case is 
remanded for further proceedings. 
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MEMORANDUM AND ORDER  
 
JOHN A. ROSS, District Judge. 
This matter is before the Court on the 
following motions: Defendant Vernon Martin’s 
Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 52); 
Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
against Defendant Vernon Martin on the Issue of 
Liability (Doc. No. 57); Defendants Meinberg,  
Hawkins, Hoffman and Wagner’s Motion for 
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Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 59); Plaintiff’s Motion 
for Partial Summary Judgment Against Defendants 
Meinberg, Hawkins, Hoffman and Wagner on the 
Issue of Probable Cause (Doc. No. 64); Plaintiff’s 
Motion to Exclude or, in the Alternative, to Limit the 
Trial Testimony of Diane Damos (Doc. No. 78); and 
Defendants’ Motions to Exclude Testimony of 
Plaintiff’s Expert Artemis Keitt Darby. (Doc. Nos. 80, 
82) The motions are briefed and ready for 
disposition.1   
 
I. Factual background23 
 Plaintiff Thomas A. Bowden brings this §1983 
action against Deputy Sheriff Vernon  
Martin (Martin), Lieutenant Colonel Steve Meinberg 
(Meinberg), Lieutenant Patrick Hawkins  
(Hawkins), and Corporal Chris Hoffman (Hoffman) of 
the Jefferson County Sheriff’s Office, and Wes 
                                            
1 Plaintiff did not file a reply to Defendants’ memoranda in 
opposition to his motions for partial summary judgment or his 
motion to exclude the trial testimony of Diane Damos. 
Defendants did not file a reply to Plaintiff’s memorandum in 
opposition to their motions to exclude the testimony of his expert 
Artemis Keitt Darby.     
  
2 The factual background is taken from Plaintiff’s Statements of 
Uncontroverted Material Facts (PSOF-1, Doc. No.  
3 -1; PSOF-2, Doc. No. 65), Defendant Vernon Martin’s 
Statement of Uncontroverted Material Facts (Martin SOF, Doc. 
No. 53) and Statement of Additional Material Facts (Martin 
ASOF, Doc. No. 72), and Defendants Steve Meinberg, Patrick 
Hawkins, Chris Hoffman and Wes Wagner’s Statement of 
Uncontroverted Material Facts.  
(County Defendants SOF, Doc. No. 61)  
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Wagner (Wagner), Jefferson County Clerk, all in 
their individual and official capacities, as well as two 
Jefferson County residents, Benjamin Simmons and 
Aaron Gyurica.4 Plaintiff alleges Defendants 
conspired to have him arrested for the crime of 
unlawful use of a weapon without probable cause in 
violation of his civil rights. (First Amended 
Complaint for Damages (FAC), Doc. No. 41) He 
further alleges state law claims of false arrest, 
malicious prosecution, fraudulent concealment and 
civil conspiracy.  
 
This action arises out of an incident that 
occurred on January 29, 2009 in the area of  
Plaintiff’s home located at 2120 Seneca Court in 
Jefferson County, Missouri. Defendants Ben  
Simmons and Aaron Gyurica were fishing from a 
bridge crossing Plattin Creek on Seneca Drive.  
Plaintiff saw the men fishing and shouted out at 
them to identify themselves. Simmons and Gyurica 
did not respond. Plaintiff fired a shotgun into the air 
from his back deck. According to Plaintiff, he fired 
his shotgun in the opposite direction of Simmons and 
Gyurica. (Martin SOF at ¶ 9) Following the gunshot, 
Plaintiff and Simmons engaged in a heated verbal 
altercation while Plaintiff was holding his shotgun. 
Thereafter, both Plaintiff and Simmons called 911 to 
report the incident. Martin responded to the calls. 
   
Martin went first to the residence of Barbara 
Voyles, Simmons’ grandmother. He spoke with 
                                            
4 A clerk’s entry of default was entered against Simmons and 
Gyurica for their failure to file an answer or other responsive 
pleading within the time required by Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(d)(3). (Doc. 
Nos. 16, 17)   
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Simmons and Gyruica, who told him they heard a 
shotgun blast and believed Plaintiff shot at them 
because they saw leaves fall in front of them 
following the blast. Simmons demanded Plaintiff be 
arrested; Gyurica insisted something be done. Voyles 
said she guessed she could call Howard Wagner to 
“see what she could do about this.” (Martin SOF at ¶ 
8). Whether Howard Wagner was actually called is 
disputed. (See Voyles Depo., Doc. No. 53-7 at 29:16-
30:1; Simmons Affidavit, Doc. No. 61-5 at ¶ 4(a); 
County Defendants SOF at ¶ 8).5 Next, Martin spoke 
with Plaintiff at his residence. Plaintiff told Martin 
about the exchange with Simmons and that he had 
fired his shotgun in the opposite direction of the two 
men. He also told Martin about the verbal altercation 
he had with Simmons while he, Plaintiff, was holding 
his shotgun.   
Martin then spoke by telephone with his 
supervisor, Defendant Hoffman. Upon hearing the 
facts from Martin, Hoffman ordered Martin to seize 
Plaintiff’s shotgun and write a report and probable 
cause statement for unlawful use of a weapon. 
According to Martin, in that phone call Hoffman told 
him that “somebody from [the trailer that Simmons 
was at] had called Howard Wagner because they had 
worked for Howard Wagner.” Martin further testified 
that “Howard Wagner, allegedly – and I don’t know 
this to be true, but Howard Wagner allegedly called 
                                            
5 Pursuant to a subpoena, Plaintiff obtained call detail records 
from AT&T showing three calls made to Jefferson County 
government telephone extensions during the time Martin was on 
the scene investigating the incident, including two to the main 
phone number for the Jefferson County Clerk’s office at 9:39 a.m. 
and 10:18 a.m. ( Doc. No. 58-9)  
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Lt. Colonel Meinberg ….who called Lt. Hawkins and 
Lt. Hawkins contacted [Cpl. Hoffman] to convey to 
me to do a report and seize the weapon and to draft a 
probable cause statement charging Mr. Bowden with 
unlawful use of a weapon.” (PSOF-1 at ¶ 11e; PSOF-
2 at ¶ 5e; Martin SOF at ¶ 14; County Defendants 
SOF at ¶¶ 4-5) The County Defendants deny having 
any communication with each other regarding the 
incident. (County Defendants SOF at ¶¶ 2, 3, 7)  
 
Martin’s probable cause statement alleges the 
following:  
 
I, Deputy Vernon Martin #242, knowing that 
false statements on this form are punishable 
by law, state that the facts contained herein are true.  
  
1. I have probable cause to believe that on 
7/29/2009, at 2120 Seneca Court, Festus,  
Missouri, in the County of Jefferson, 
Thomas Bowden … committed one or more 
criminal offense(s):  
  
Unlawful Use of a Weapon  
  
2. The facts supporting this belief are as 
follows:  
  
According to the victim’s [sic], they reported 
that they parked their pickup truck on a low 
water bridge in the area of 2120 Seneca Court, 
to fish off the bridge when a local resident 
Thomas Bowden shoot [sic] at them with his 
shotgun.  
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(Emphasis added). (Doc. No. 53-5 at 8) Martin later 
admitted that after fully investigating the matter, he 
did not believe a crime had been committed and that 
he would not have written and signed a probable 
cause statement but for his supervising officer 
ordering him to do so. (PSOF-1 at 11; PSOF-2 at 5).  
 
Plaintiff was subsequently charged with 
unlawful use of a weapon, a Class D felony in 
violation of RSMo. § 571.030.1(4).6 A preliminary 
hearing was held before Jefferson County Circuit 
Court Judge Nathan B. Stewart. Simmons and 
Martin both testified and were crossexamined by 
Plaintiff’s counsel. Plaintiff disputes that his 
attorney was given the opportunity to present 
evidence at the preliminary hearing. (Martin SOF at 
¶ 19 and Pltf. Resp.) Judge Stewart determined that 
probable cause existed to charge Plaintiff with 
unlawful use of a weapon and bound him over for 
trial. Martin testified at Plaintiff’s criminal trial. 
Plaintiff was acquitted following a jury trial.   
 
 II.  Summary Judgment motions  
I. A. LEGAL STANDARD  
Summary judgment is appropriate when no 
genuine issue of material fact exists in the case and 
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law.  See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477  U.S. 317, 322-
23 (1986).  The initial burden is placed on the moving 
party.  City of Mt. Pleasant, Iowa v. Associated Elec. 
                                            
6 § 571.030.1(4) provides that “[a] person commits the crime of 
unlawful use of weapons if he or she knowingly: exhibits, in the 
presence of one or more persons, any weapon readily capable of 
lethal use in an angry or threatening manner…”  
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Co-op., Inc., 838 F.2d 268, 273 (8th Cir. 1988).  If the 
record demonstrates that no genuine issue of fact is 
in dispute, the burden then shifts to the non-moving 
party, who must set forth affirmative evidence and 
specific facts showing a genuine dispute on that 
issue.  Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 
249 (1986).  In determining whether summary 
judgment is appropriate in a particular case, the 
Court must review the facts in a light most favorable 
to the party opposing the motion and give that party 
the benefit of any inferences that logically can be 
drawn from those facts. The Court is required to 
resolve all conflicts of evidence in favor of the 
nonmoving party. Osborn v. E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc., 
853 F.2d 616, 619  
(8th Cir. 1988).  
II. DISCUSSION  
Central to all of the summary judgment 
motions is the issue of probable cause for Plaintiff’s 
arrest. “The substance of all the definitions of 
probable cause is a reasonable ground for belief of 
guilt.” Green v. State of Missouri, 734 F.Supp.2d. 
814, 832 (E.D.Mo.2010) (quoting Brinegar v. United 
States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949)). More specifically, 
“[p]robable cause exists if the totality of facts based 
on reasonably trustworthy information would justify 
a prudent person in believing the individual arrested 
had committed an offense at the time of the arrest.” 
Hoffmeyer v. Porter, 2012 WL 5845094, at *3 
(E.D.Mo. Nov. 19, 2012) (quoting Green v. Nocciero, 
676 F.3d 748, 751 (8th Cir.2012)). In an action for 
false arrest, probable cause is generally a question of 
fact for the jury. Dowell v. Lincoln County, 927 
F.Supp.2d 741, 756 (E.D.Mo. 2013) (citing State v. 
Morgenroth, 227 S.W.3d 517, 522 n. 6 
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(Mo.Ct.App.2007).  
 
Nonetheless, to defeat summary judgment 
there must be material facts in dispute, “with one 
version establishing reasonable grounds and another 
refuting it.” Id. (quoting Signorino v. Nat'l  
Super Mkts., Inc., 782 S.W.2d 100, 103 
(Mo.Ct.App.1989)).   
III. ESTOPPEL  
As a threshold matter, Defendants argue 
Plaintiff is estopped from litigating the issue of 
probable cause in light of the Jefferson County 
Circuit Court’s finding of probable cause in the 
preliminary hearing. Defendants rely on Guenther v. 
Holmgren, 738 F.2d 879 (7th Cir. 1984) and Sanders 
v. Frisby, 736 F.2d 1230 (8th Cir. 1984), two cases 
holding that the doctrine of collateral estoppel barred 
plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims for alleged violations of 
Fourth Amendment rights because those claims had 
already been litigated and decided adversely to them 
during state court proceedings. (Doc. No. 56 at 5-8) 
Plaintiff responds that a probable cause finding 
made in a “summary and cursory” criminal 
preliminary hearing does not estop him from later 
bringing a § 1983 claim challenging the integrity, 
rather than the sufficiency, of the evidence, citing 
Whitley v. Seibel, 676 F.2d 245 (7th Cir. 1982). 
Plaintiff argues he did not have an opportunity to 
fully discover evidence and litigate whether his 
arrest was perpetrated in bad faith and in 
furtherance of a conspiracy or to appeal the circuit 
court’s finding of probable cause. (Doc. No. 75 at 6-
10). 
 
In Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980), the 
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Supreme Court held that a federal court must “give 
preclusive effect to state court judgments whenever 
the courts of the state from which the judgments 
emerged would do so.” Id. at 96. In Haring v. Prosise, 
462 U.S. 306 (1983), the Court indicated that federal 
courts should apply state collateral estoppel law in 
determining whether a § 1983 claim is precluded by 
a prior state proceeding.   
 
Missouri courts consider four factors in 
applying collateral estoppel: (1) the issues in the 
present case and the prior adjudication must be 
identical; (2) the judgment in the prior adjudication 
must be on the merits; (3) “the party against whom 
collateral estoppel [is] asserted [must have been] the 
same party or in privity with a party in the prior 
adjudication;” and (4) “the party against whom 
collateral estoppel is asserted [must] have [had] a 
full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the 
prior suit.” In re Scarborough, 171 F.3d 638, 641-42 
(8th Cir. 1999) (quoting State v. Nunley, 923 S.W.2d 
911, 922 (Mo.1996)).   
 
Applying these principles, the court in 
Guenther concluded that Guenther’s probable cause 
claim was precluded by the state court’s 
determination of that claim in the state criminal 
preliminary hearing where he was able to thoroughly 
litigate and challenge issues of the arresting officer’s 
veracity and good faith. Guenther, 738 F.2d at 884. 
Specifically, Guenther’s counsel rigorously cross-
examined the officer regarding his version of the 
events leading up to the arrest and called a witness 
to rebut the officer’s version. The court heard 
considerable testimony from both sides before 
making its probable cause determination. The 
Guenther court held “[t]here can be little doubt that 
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the issue of [the officer’s] veracity and good faith – 
the linchpin of [plaintiff’s] § 1983 Fourth 
Amendment claim – was both raised and actually 
litigated in the preliminary hearing.” Id.   
 
In Sanders, the court determined that Sanders 
had fully litigated his Fourth Amendment claims in 
the state trial court, but failed on appeal from his 
conviction to set forth any assignments of error with 
respect to the trial court’s denial of those claims, 
thereby waiving them. Sanders, 736 F.2d at 1232. 
Under these circumstances, the court concluded that 
a Missouri court would give collateral estoppel effect 
to the trial court’s ruling on the Fourth Amendment  
claims in a subsequent § 1983 action based on the 
same claims. Id.  
 
These cases are distinguishable from Whitely, 
676 F.2d 245. In that case, Whitely’s § 1983 claim 
was based on the arresting officer’s failure to 
investigate his alibi and his misrepresentations to 
prosecuting authorities that he had checked the alibi 
and found it to be false. Unlike in Guenther, Whitely, 
presumably for tactical reasons, never raised or 
litigated the issue of the arresting officer's veracity 
during the preliminary hearing; nor did he raise or 
litigate the issue of his purported alibi witness. Id. at 
249. The court concluded that the finding of probable 
cause at the preliminary hearing did not estop 
Whitely from bringing his § 1983 suit for false arrest 
because it attacked the integrity, rather than the 
sufficiency, of the evidence. In addition, the court 
found Whitely’s decision not to raise his alibi defense 
at the preliminary hearing did not amount to a 
waiver of that defense. The court questioned whether 
collateral estoppel would ever be appropriate solely 
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on the basis of a preliminary hearing, noting that a 
preliminary hearing is a “relatively summary 
proceeding, designed only to reach an interim 
decision in the process of bringing a defendant to 
trial. The suspect has no right to discover what is in 
the prosecutor's arsenal, or to appeal the finding of 
probable cause. In fact, the preliminary hearing can 
be dispensed with entirely and the case taken 
directly to a grand jury. Under these circumstances a 
suspect may not have had time to prepare his case 
when the preliminary hearing is held, or may have 
strategic reasons for waiting until trial to make his 
defense.” Id. at 249-50.   
 
In the instant case, Plaintiff disputes that he 
was able to present evidence and fully and fairly 
litigate the issue of the integrity of the evidence 
presented at the preliminary hearing. (See Martin 
SOF at ¶ 19 and Pltf. Resp.) The Court has reviewed 
the transcript of Plaintiff’s preliminary hearing and 
in particular Martin’s testimony. (Doc. No. 53-6 at 
31:5-51:20) Plaintiff’s counsel attempted to question 
Martin on his opinion as to whether or not a crime 
had been committed; however, the State’s objection 
to the line of questioning was sustained. (Id. at 49:3-
14) Thus, Judge Stewart did not consider the 
veracity of the state’s case against Plaintiff. As in 
Whitley, Plaintiff’s § 1983 suit attacks the integrity, 
rather than the sufficiency of the evidence of 
probable cause. Under these circumstances, the 
Court concludes that collateral estoppel does not 
apply to bar Plaintiff’s suit. “Nothing in Allen v. 
McCurry requires us to depart from the traditional 
precept that a party is not estopped to raise issues 
that he has had less than a “full and fair 
opportunity” to litigate in a prior proceeding.” 
Whitley, 676 F.2d at 250 (citing 449 U.S. at 95 n. 7, 
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100-101).   
 
IV. PROBABLE CAUSE   
In support of his motions for partial summary 
judgment, Plaintiff argues that Martin’s admissions 
that he lacked probable cause to arrest Plaintiff and 
believed Plaintiff’s rights were violated are 
dispositive of the issue of probable cause. 
Specifically, Martin testified on deposition that he 
did not believe the facts of the situation fit the 
elements of any crime, including any weapons crime 
(Martin Deposition, Doc. No. 65-2, 27:3-8, 32:8-19, 
38:17-24, 66:22-67:14); that he would not have 
written and signed a probable cause statement but 
for Hoffman ordering him to do so (Id. at 40:21 -25, 
41:1-2, 43:7-44:2); and that he believes Plaintiff’s 
rights were violated because “there was no just cause 
for this report to even be wrote (sic)” and it was only 
written because it was ordered from the top down. 
(Id. at 17:18-24). 
 
Defendants respond that because probable 
cause depends on an objective analysis of the facts, 
i.e., what a reasonable officer could have believed 
under the circumstances, see Royster v. Nichols, 698 
F.3d 681, 688 (8th Cir. 2012), Martin’s subjective 
opinion on the existence of probable cause is neither 
relevant nor determinative. Defendants argue that 
the facts known to Martin at the time he wrote his 
probable cause statement were sufficient under the 
objective reasonableness standard. When Martin 
investigated the scene, Simmons told him he believed 
Plaintiff shot at him because he heard a gunshot, 
after which leaves fell from a tree in his immediate 
vicinity. (Martin ASOF at ¶ 3) In addition, Plaintiff 
admitted firing his shotgun, albeit in the opposite 
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direction (id. at ¶ 4), and that he and Simmons had 
engaged in a heated discussion after the shot was 
fired, during which time Plaintiff held his shotgun. 
(Id. at ¶¶ 1-5) Defendants maintain that Martin did 
not falsify any of the facts reported to him – his 
summary of the victims’ statement is accurate – and 
that the only information omitted from his probable 
cause statement is his subjective belief that there 
was no probable cause to arrest Plaintiff, which 
omission is immaterial.   
 
In reply, Plaintiff asserts that Martin’s 
subjective beliefs are indeed relevant because the 
Fourth Amendment requires an affiant to be truthful 
and act in good faith. “[W]hen the Fourth 
Amendment demands a factual showing sufficient to 
comprise ‘probable cause,’ the obvious assumption is 
that there will be a truthful showing. This does not 
mean “truthful” in the sense that every fact recited in 
the warrant affidavit is necessarily correct . . . But 
surely it is to be “truthful” in the sense that the 
information put forth is believed or appropriately accepted 
by the affiant as true.” Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 
154, 164-65 (1978). (Emphasis added.)   
 
It is clearly established that the Fourth 
Amendment prohibits a police officer from 
manufacturing probable cause by knowingly 
including false statements in a warrant affidavit. See 
Franks, 438 U.S. 154. Here, it is undisputed that at 
the time he completed his report, Martin did not in 
fact believe there was probable cause to arrest 
Plaintiff.  And yet, in his probable cause statement, 
Martin stated he had probable cause to believe 
Plaintiff committed a crime:  
 
I, Deputy Vernon Martin #242, knowing that 
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false statements on this form are punishable by 
law, state that the facts contained herein are 
true.  
  
1. I have probable cause to believe that [Plaintiff 
committed the offense of unlawful use of 
weapon].  
  
An officer must have a reasonable belief that an 
offense is occurring. If Martin had no reasonable 
basis for believing that Plaintiff had committed a 
crime it, then it was not objectively reasonable for 
him to use the information to obtain an arrest 
warrant. Burk v. Beene, 948 F.2d 489, 492 (8th Cir. 
1991). Under the facts and circumstances of this 
case, the Court finds a genuine issue of material fact 
regarding the existence of probable cause for the 
arrest and will therefore deny the motions for 
summary judgment on this basis.  
 
V. STATE LAW CLAIMS  
Plaintiff asserts claims against Defendants for 
civil conspiracy, fraudulent concealment, false arrest 
and malicious prosecution, all of which rely on a 
showing that there was no probable cause for 
Plaintiff’s arrest. As discussed above, the Court 
cannot make a probable cause determination based 
on the record before it. Thus, it cannot enter 
judgment as a matter of law on  
Defendants’ motions on the merits of Plaintiff’s state 
law claims.   
VI. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY  
Defendant Martin has also raised the issue of 
qualified immunity. To determine whether an official 
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is entitled to qualified immunity, the Court conducts 
a two-part analysis. First, the Court must determine 
whether, “taking the facts in the light most favorable 
to the injured party, the facts alleged demonstrate 
that the official's conduct violated a constitutional 
right.” White v. McKinley, 519 F.3d 806, 813 (8th 
Cir.2008) (citing Clemmons v. Armontrout, 477 F.3d 
962, 965 (8th Cir.2007)). If a violation is found, the 
Court must then analyze whether the right was 
clearly established. Id. “To determine whether a 
right is clearly established we ask whether it would 
be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was 
unlawful in the situation he confronted.” Id.  
 
Here, the right in question is the Fourth 
Amendment right not to be arrested without 
probable cause, a right which is clearly established. 
See Habiger v. City of Fargo, 80 F.3d 289, 295 (8th 
Cir. 1996). As a result, the qualified immunity 
inquiry is identical to the probable cause question. 
See Alberternst v. Hunt, 2011 WL 6140888, at *4 
(E.D.Mo. Dec. 9, 2011). Because the Court has found 
there is a genuine issue of material fact as to 
whether probable cause existed, Martin is not 
entitled to summary judgment based on qualified 
immunity. White, 519 F.3d at 813 (“The party 
asserting immunity always has the burden to 
establish the relevant predicate facts, and at the 
summary judgment stage, the nonmoving party is 
given the benefit of all reasonable inferences. If there 
is a genuine dispute concerning predicate facts 
material to the qualified immunity issue, the 
defendant is not entitled to summary judgment.”). 
See also Berry v. Davis, No. 13-3610 (8th Cir. August 
18, 2014) (citing Nance v. Sammis, 586 F.3d 604, 609 
(8th Cir. 2009) (denial of qualified immunity will be 
affirmed if genuine issue of material fact exists as to 
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whether reasonable officer could have believed his 
actions were lawful).   
 
II. Daubert motions  
 
Plaintiff is a corporate airplane pilot. He 
claims he has suffered lost past earnings and will 
sustain lost future earnings as a result of the felony 
gun charge that now appears on a criminal 
background check. (FAC at ¶ 37g.) Both sides have 
endorsed expert witnesses to give their opinions 
concerning the effect of the felony gun charge on 
Plaintiff’s ability to earn a living as a  
professional pilot.   
VII. A. LEGAL STANDARD   
  
 The federal rules of evidence and related case law 
require that an expert be qualified and that the 
expert's testimony be both reliable and relevant. See 
Federal Rule of Evidence 702; Kumho Tire Co. v. 
Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152 (1999). The burden of 
establishing this predicate for an expert's testimony 
falls on the party producing the expert; the trial 
court determines whether that party has met its 
burden. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 
509 U.S. 579, 589, 592, 597 (1993).   
 
An expert may be qualified by “knowledge, 
skill, experience, training, or education.” Fed.R.Evid. 
702. Testimony that is not scientific in nature is 
better judged by examining whether the expert has 
sufficient personal knowledge, work experience, or 
training to support the opinions offered. See 
Fed.R.Evid. 702; Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 150-51. 
In general, the court's responsibility “is to make 
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certain that an expert ... employs in the courtroom 
the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes 
the practice of an expert in the relevant field.” 
Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 152.  
 
Reliability hinges on the sufficiency of the 
facts or data on which the opinion is based, the 
dependability of the principles and methods 
employed, and the proper application of the 
principles and methods to the facts of the case. 
Fed.R.Evid. 702.  If the opinion is based solely or 
primarily on experience, the witness must connect 
the experience to the conclusion offered, must 
explain why the experience is a sufficient basis for 
the opinion, and must demonstrate the 
appropriateness of the application of the experience 
to the facts. Fed.R.Evid. 702, Advisory Committee 
Notes. To be relevant, the testimony must “assist the 
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to 
determine a fact in issue.” Fed.R.Evid. 702; Daubert, 
509 U.S. at 591.   
 
“Rule 702 reflects an attempt to liberalize the 
rules governing the admission of expert testimony.” 
Weisgram v. Marley Co., 169 F.3d 514, 523 (8th 
Cir.1999), aff'd, 528 U.S. 440  
(2000). The Rule “favors admissibility if the 
testimony will assist the trier of fact.” Clark v. 
Heidrick, 150 F.3d 912, 915 (8th Cir.1998). Doubt 
regarding “whether an expert's testimony will be 
useful should generally be resolved in favor of 
admissibility.” Id. (citation and internal  
quotation omitted).  
 
B. Discussion  
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VIII. PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO EXCLUDE 
DIANE DAMOS’S TESTIMONY  
Defendants retained Diane L. Damos, Ph.D., 
to address the statements of fact and opinions offered 
by Plaintiff’s expert Artemis Keitt (Kit) Darby, opine 
on the extent to which the criminal charges against 
Plaintiff impact his employability in the aviation 
industry, and address Plaintiff’s claims in light of his 
documented attempts to obtain employment. (Damos 
Report, Doc. No. 79-1 at 2) Dr. Damos is an aviation 
psychologist who consults with the airline industry 
on pilot selection and aviation human factors. (CV of 
Diane L. Damos, Doc. No. 79-1 at 27-51) Based on 
her research, review of the materials provided and 
her personal experience in the aviation industry, Dr. 
Damos opined that the criminal matter would have 
“no significant impact on [Plaintiff’s] employability in 
the aviation industry after his acquittal.” (Damos 
Report at 3-4) First she states that the assertion by 
Plaintiff’s expert, Mr. Kit Darby, that Plaintiff had a 
100% probability of employment as a vice president 
of flight operations by a foreign corporation from the 
time of the incident until age 65 has no basis in fact, 
is speculative, and cannot be held to a reasonable 
degree of certainty. (Id. at 3) Second, Dr. Damos 
asserts that contrary to Mr. Darby’s Career Earnings 
and Benefits Model Report, no one can say to a 
reasonable degree of certainty that Plaintiff will be 
unable to obtain a position as a non-flying flight 
department manager because of his arrest record. 
(Id.) Finally, Dr. Damos states that during the period 
from July 2009 to June 2010, Plaintiff was not 
conclusively prevented from working as a 
professional pilot overseas. (Id. at 4). 
 
In support of his motion, Plaintiff argues it is 
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impossible for Dr. Damos to give a reliable and 
qualified opinion on the question at issue here for 
two reasons. First, she lacks actual real world 
experience in hiring pilots. (Doc. No. 79 at 4) Dr. 
Damos admits she only teaches how to quantify the 
selection of pilots and has never actually been 
employed by a private or commercial airline to 
perform the pilot screening and selection. (Damos 
Deposition, Doc. No. 79-2 at 55:2256:5; 73:23-75:1). 
Second, Dr. Damos lacks knowledge and experience 
in criminal history background checks. (Doc. No. 79 
at 5) Although she acknowledges that criminal 
background checks are performed on pilots during 
the hiring process and that an applicant’s criminal 
history will be a factor in the hiring process (see 
Damos Depo., 78:1-7), she does not know whether a 
felony criminal charge absent a conviction will 
appear on a criminal history background check. (Id. 
at 7:14-23; 58:13-16; 60:13-20).  
 
The Court is satisfied that Dr. Damos is 
qualified to testify regarding Plaintiff’s employability 
in the airline industry based on her thirty-plus years 
of general aviation industry experience as well as her 
professional experience in teaching and consulting on 
the screening and selection of pilots. The fact that 
she has not actually worked for an airline does not 
persuade the Court otherwise. The extent of an 
expert's experience or training goes to the weight of 
the witness’s testimony, not its admissibility. 
Robinson v. GEICO Gen. Ins. Co., 447 F.3d 1096, 
1100-01 (8th Cir.2006) (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted). Dr. Damos’s relative experience in 
the matter at issue may be explored by Plaintiff on 
cross-examination. See Minn.Supply Co. v. Raymond 
Corp., 472 F.3d 524, 544 (8th Cir. 2006). For these 
reasons, Plaintiff’s motion to exclude Dr. Damos’s 
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testimony will be denied.   
IX. DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO EXCLUDE 
ARTEMIS KEITT DARBY’S TESTIMONY   
Kit Darby was retained to develop an 
employability and career earnings model for 
Plaintiff. (Darby Expert Report, Doc. No.  81-2 at 2) 
Mr. Darby is a pilot, a former publisher of aviation 
industry job availability and salary information, and 
an aviation industry career consultant. He is 
president of KitDarby.comAviation Consulting, LLC.  
(Darby Report, at 2) Mr. Darby opined that the most 
probable income loss for Plaintiff is $2,101,739, 
which reflects the expected salary, benefits, and 
retirement income loss after Plaintiff’s arrest on July 
29, 2009. (Id. at 15) He further opines that the 
criminal charge puts Plaintiff at a competitive 
disadvantage in the interview process. (Id. at 6; 
Darby Deposition, Doc. No. 81-1 at 67:1-68:24)  
 Defendants argue Mr. Darby’s ultimate opinion on 
employability is not reliable because it requires 
speculation, is not based on experience, ignores 
objective data, and provides unfounded extrapolation 
from the facts of record. (Doc. No. 80 at 10-12) 
Defendants further argue that Mr. Darby’s opinions 
regarding impact on employability, based 
“somewhat” on common sense and borne out by “the 
logic of the common man” (see Darby Deposition, 
Doc. No. 81-1 at 195:23-25; 196:1-8), are not helpful 
to a jury. (Doc. No. 80 at 3) Lastly, Defendants argue 
Mr. Darby is unqualified to render opinions 
regarding employability in this case. (Doc. No. 80 at 
12-13). 
 
The Court is satisfied that Mr. Darby is 
qualified to testify regarding Plaintiff’s employability 
in the airline industry based on his thirty plus years 
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of experience analyzing the pilot job market, data 
compilation, interviews with airline applicants and 
recruiting personnel. (Darby Professional 
Publications and Biography, Doc. No. 81-2 at 19-39) 
Because the airline industry is highly specialized and 
regulated, the Court finds Mr. Darby’s testimony 
regarding the requirements and qualifications for 
employment as a pilot will be helpful to a jury.  
 
Defendants take issue with Mr. Darby’s 
underlying data, particularly with regard to foreign 
market salaries and benefits. Generally, questions as 
to the sources and bases of an expert’s opinion affect 
the weight, rather than the admissibility of the 
opinion. “Only if the expert’s opinion is so 
fundamentally unsupported that it can offer no 
assistance to the jury must such testimony be 
excluded.” Minn. Supply Co. v. Raymond Corp., 472 
F.3d 524, 544 (8th Cir. 2006) (quotation omitted). For 
these reasons, Defendants’ motions to exclude Mr. 
Darby’s opinions and testimony will be denied.  
 
Accordingly,  
 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant 
Vernon Martin’s Motion for Summary 
Judgment [52] is DENIED.  
 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
against Defendant Vernon Martin on the Issue 
of Liability [57] is DENIED.  
 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants 
Meinberg, Hawkins, Hoffman and  Wagner’s 
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Motion for Summary Judgment [59] is 
DENIED.  
 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s   
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
Against Defendants Meinberg, Hawkins, 
Hoffman and Wagner on the Issue of Probable 
Cause [64] is DENIED.  
 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s 
Motion to Exclude or, in the Alternative,  
to Limit the Trial Testimony of Diane Damos 
[78] is DENIED.  
 
IT IS FINALLY ORDERED that Defendants’ 
Motions to Exclude Testimony of  Plaintiff’s 
Expert Artemis Keitt Darby [80, 82] are 
DENIED.  
  
Dated this 28th day of August, 2014.  
  
 /s/ John A. Ross         
       
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 
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APPENDIX C 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT 
______________ 
 
No. 14-3074 
______________ 
 
Thomas A. Bowden, 
 
Plaintiff - Appellee, 
 
v. 
 
Steve Meinberg; Patrick Hawkins; Chris Hoffman, 
 
Defendants, 
 
Vernon Martin, 
 
Defendant - Appellant, 
 
Benjamin Simmons; Aaron Gyurica; Wes Wagner, 
 
Defendants. 
 
______________ 
 
No. 14-3075 
______________ 
 
Thomas A. Bowden, 
 
Plaintiff - Appellee, 
 
v.  
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Steve Meinberg; Patrick Hawkins; Chris Hoffman, 
 
Defendants - Appellants, 
 
Vernon Martin; Benjamin Simmons; Aaron Gyurica, 
 
Defendants,  
 
Wes Wagner, 
 
Defendant - Appellant. 
 
__________________________________________ 
 
Appeals from United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Missouri - St. Louis 
__________________________________________ 
 
ORDER 
The petition for rehearing en banc is denied. The 
petition for rehearing by the panel is also denied. 
October 22, 2015  
Order Entered at the Direction of the Court:  
Clerk, U.S. Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit. 
____________________________________ 
 /s/ Michael E. Gans 
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APPENDIX D 
 
The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution:  
 
“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons 
or things to be seized.”  
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 APPENDIX E 
 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 
Effective: October 19, 1996 
§ 1983. Civil action for deprivation of rights 
 Every person who, under color of any statute, 
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State 
or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or 
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United 
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof 
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or 
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, 
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at 
law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for 
redress, except that in any action brought against a 
judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such 
officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not 
be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated 
or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the 
purposes of this section, any Act of Congress 
applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia 
shall be considered to be a statute of the District of 
Columbia. 
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APPENDIX F 
VERNON'S ANNOTATED MISSOURI STATUTES 
Effective: August 28, 2007 to August 27, 2010 
 
V.A.M.S. 571.030 
571.030. Unlawful use of weapons—exceptions—
penalties—qualified retired peace officers, 
identification 
 
1. A person commits the crime of unlawful use of 
weapons if he or she knowingly: 
(1) Carries concealed upon or about his or her 
person a knife, a firearm, a blackjack or any other 
weapon readily capable of lethal use; or 
(2) Sets a spring gun; or 
(3) Discharges or shoots a firearm into a dwelling 
house, a railroad train, boat, aircraft, or motor vehicle 
as defined in section 302.010, RSMo, or any building 
or structure used for the assembling of people; or 
(4) Exhibits, in the presence of one or more 
persons, any weapon readily capable of lethal use in 
an angry or threatening manner; or 
(5) Possesses or discharges a firearm or projectile 
weapon while intoxicated; or 
(6) Discharges a firearm within one hundred 
yards of any occupied schoolhouse, courthouse, or 
church building; or 
(7) Discharges or shoots a firearm at a mark, at 
any object, or at random, on, along or across a public 
highway or discharges or shoots a firearm into any 
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outbuilding; or 
(8) Carries a firearm or any other weapon readily 
capable of lethal use into any church or place where 
people have assembled for worship, or into any 
election precinct on any election day, or into any 
building owned or occupied by any agency of the 
federal government, state government, or political 
subdivision thereof; or 
(9) Discharges or shoots a firearm at or from a 
motor vehicle, as defined in section 301.010, RSMo, 
discharges or shoots a firearm at any person, or at any 
other motor vehicle, or at any building or habitable 
structure, unless the person was lawfully acting in 
self-defense; or 
(10) Carries a firearm, whether loaded or 
unloaded, or any other weapon readily capable of 
lethal use into any school, onto any school bus, or onto 
the premises of any function or activity sponsored or 
sanctioned by school officials or the district school 
board. 
2. Subdivisions (1), (3), (4), (6), (7), (8), (9) and (10) 
of subsection 1 of this section shall not apply to or 
affect any of the following: 
(1) All state, county and municipal peace officers 
who have completed the training required by the 
police officer standards and training commission 
pursuant to sections 590.030 to 590.050, RSMo, and 
possessing the duty and power of arrest for violation 
of the general criminal laws of the state or for 
violation of ordinances of counties or municipalities of 
the state, whether such officers are on or off duty, and 
whether such officers are within or outside of the law 
enforcement agency's jurisdiction, or all qualified 
retired peace officers, as defined in subsection 10 of 
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this section, and who carry the identification defined 
in subsection 11 of this section, or any person 
summoned by such officers to assist in making arrests 
or preserving the peace while actually engaged in 
assisting such officer; 
(2) Wardens, superintendents and keepers of 
prisons, penitentiaries, jails and other institutions for 
the detention of persons accused or convicted of crime; 
(3) Members of the armed forces or national guard 
while performing their official duty; 
(4) Those persons vested by article V, section 1 of 
the Constitution of Missouri with the judicial power of 
the state and those persons vested by Article III of the 
Constitution of the United States with the judicial 
power of the United States, the members of the federal 
judiciary; 
(5) Any person whose bona fide duty is to execute 
process, civil or criminal; 
(6) Any federal probation officer or federal flight 
deck officer as defined under the federal flight deck 
officer program, 49 U.S.C. Section 44921; 
(7) Any state probation or parole officer, including 
supervisors and members of the board of probation 
and parole; 
(8) Any corporate security advisor meeting the 
definition and fulfilling the requirements of the 
regulations established by the board of police 
commissioners under section 84.340, RSMo; and 
(9) Any coroner, deputy coroner, medical 
examiner, or assistant medical examiner. 
3. Subdivisions (1), (5), (8), and (10) of subsection 
1 of this section do not apply when the actor is 
transporting such weapons in a nonfunctioning state 
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or in an unloaded state when ammunition is not 
readily accessible or when such weapons are not 
readily accessible. Subdivision (1) of subsection 1 of 
this section does not apply to any person twenty-one 
years of age or older transporting a concealable 
firearm in the passenger compartment of a motor 
vehicle, so long as such concealable firearm is 
otherwise lawfully possessed, nor when the actor is 
also in possession of an exposed firearm or projectile 
weapon for the lawful pursuit of game, or is in his or 
her dwelling unit or upon premises over which the 
actor has possession, authority or control, or is 
traveling in a continuous journey peaceably through 
this state. Subdivision (10) of subsection 1 of this 
section does not apply if the firearm is otherwise 
lawfully possessed by a person while traversing school 
premises for the purposes of transporting a student to 
or from school, or possessed by an adult for the 
purposes of facilitation of a school-sanctioned firearm-
related event. 
4. Subdivisions (1), (8), and (10) of subsection 1 of 
this section shall not apply to any person who has a 
valid concealed carry endorsement issued pursuant to 
sections 571.101 to 571.121 or a valid permit or 
endorsement to carry concealed firearms issued by 
another state or political subdivision of another state. 
5. Subdivisions (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), and (10) 
of subsection 1 of this section shall not apply to 
persons who are engaged in a lawful act of defense 
pursuant to section 563.031, RSMo. 
6. Nothing in this section shall make it unlawful 
for a student to actually participate in school-
sanctioned gun safety courses, student military or 
ROTC courses, or other school-sponsored firearm-
related events, provided the student does not carry a 
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firearm or other weapon readily capable of lethal use 
into any school, onto any school bus, or onto the 
premises of any other function or activity sponsored 
or sanctioned by school officials or the district school 
board. 
7. Unlawful use of weapons is a class D felony 
unless committed pursuant to subdivision (6), (7), or 
(8) of subsection 1 of this section, in which cases it is 
a class B misdemeanor, or subdivision (5) or (10) of 
subsection 1 of this section, in which case it is a class 
A misdemeanor if the firearm is unloaded and a class 
D felony if the firearm is loaded, or subdivision (9) of 
subsection 1 of this section, in which case it is a class 
B felony, except that if the violation of subdivision (9) 
of subsection 1 of this section results in injury or death 
to another person, it is a class A felony. 
8. Violations of subdivision (9) of subsection 1 of 
this section shall be punished as follows: 
(1) For the first violation a person shall be 
sentenced to the maximum authorized term of 
imprisonment for a class B felony; 
(2) For any violation by a prior offender as defined 
in section 558.016, RSMo, a person shall be sentenced 
to the maximum authorized term of imprisonment for 
a class B felony without the possibility of parole, 
probation or conditional release for a term of ten 
years; 
(3) For any violation by a persistent offender as 
defined in section 558.016, RSMo, a person shall be 
sentenced to the maximum authorized term of 
imprisonment for a class B felony without the 
possibility of parole, probation, or conditional release; 
(4) For any violation which results in injury or 
death to another person, a person shall be sentenced 
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to an authorized disposition for a class A felony. 
9. Any person knowingly aiding or abetting any 
other person in the violation of subdivision (9) of 
subsection 1 of this section shall be subject to the same 
penalty as that prescribed by this section for 
violations by other persons. 
10. As used in this section “qualified retired peace 
officer” means an individual who: 
(1) Retired in good standing from service with a 
public agency as a peace officer, other than for reasons 
of mental instability; 
(2) Before such retirement, was authorized by law 
to engage in or supervise the prevention, detection, 
investigation, or prosecution of, or the incarceration of 
any person for, any violation of law, and had statutory 
powers of arrest; 
(3) Before such retirement, was regularly 
employed as a peace officer for an aggregate of fifteen 
years or more, or retired from service with such 
agency, after completing any applicable probationary 
period of such service, due to a service-connected 
disability, as determined by such agency; 
(4) Has a nonforfeitable right to benefits under the 
retirement plan of the agency if such a plan is 
available; 
(5) During the most recent twelve-month period, 
has met, at the expense of the individual, the 
standards for training and qualification for active 
peace officers to carry firearms; 
(6) Is not under the influence of alcohol or another 
intoxicating or hallucinatory drug or substance; and 
(7) Is not prohibited by federal law from receiving 
a firearm. 
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11. The identification required by subdivision (1) 
of subsection 2 of this section is: 
(1) A photographic identification issued by the 
agency from which the individual retired from service 
as a peace officer that indicates that the individual 
has, not less recently than one year before the date the 
individual is carrying the concealed firearm, been 
tested or otherwise found by the agency to meet the 
standards established by the agency for training and 
qualification for active peace officers to carry a 
firearm of the same type as the concealed firearm; or 
(2) A photographic identification issued by the 
agency from which the individual retired from service 
as a peace officer; and 
(3) A certification issued by the state in which the 
individual resides that indicates that the individual 
has, not less recently than one year before the date the 
individual is carrying the concealed firearm, been 
tested or otherwise found by the state to meet the 
standards established by the state for training and 
qualification for active peace officers to carry a 
firearm of the same type as the concealed firearm. 
 
 
